Estimating the Social Profitability of India's Rural Roads Program: A Bumpy Ride by Bell, Clive
Policy Research Working Paper 6168
Estimating the Social Profitability 
of India’s Rural Roads Program
A Bumpy Ride
Clive Bell 
The World Bank
South Asia Region
Transport Unit
August 2012
WPS6168
Pu
bl
ic 
Di
sc
lo
su
re
 A
ut
ho
riz
ed
Pu
bl
ic 
Di
sc
lo
su
re
 A
ut
ho
riz
ed
Pu
bl
ic 
Di
sc
lo
su
re
 A
ut
ho
riz
ed
Pu
bl
ic 
Di
sc
lo
su
re
 A
ut
ho
riz
ed
Produced by the Research Support Team
Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the 
names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those 
of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and 
its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
Policy Research Working Paper 6168
India’s rural roads program, Pradhan Mantri Gram Sadak 
Yojana, aims to draw villagers into the mainstream by 
improving not only their terms of trade, but also their 
educational attainments and health. Treating each 
all-weather feeder road as an isolated element within 
the larger network, and using shadow prices to value 
the main components of costs and benefits, the paper 
This paper is a product of the Trasnport Unit, South Asia Region. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide 
open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world. Policy Research 
Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at clive.bell@urz.
uni-heidelberg.de.  
demonstrates that further investments in the program 
are, with high probability, socially profitable, especially 
in poorer and more densely settled regions. Taking the 
entire set of new individual roads together, qualitative 
arguments suggest that their external and spill-over effects 
on the system as a whole probably generate some net 
additional benefits, but of very uncertain magnitude.
Estimating the Social Profitability of India’s Rural
Roads Program: A Bumpy Ride
Clive Bell∗
First version: August, 2010
This version: August, 2012
Abstract
India’s rural roads program, Pradhan Mantri Gram Sadak Yojana, aims to draw
villagers into the mainstream by improving not only their terms of trade, but
also their educational attainments and health. Treating each all-weather feeder
road as an isolated element within the larger network, and using shadow prices
to value the main components of costs and benefits, this paper demonstrates that
further investments in the program are, with high probability, socially profitable,
especially in poorer and more densely settled regions. Taking the entire set of new
individual roads together, qualitative arguments suggest that their external and
spillover effects on the system as a whole probably generate some net additional
benefits, but of very uncertain magnitude.
Keywords: Rural roads, social cost-benefit analysis, India
JEL Classification: D61, H54, O18, O22
Sector Board: Transport
∗University of Heidelberg, INF 330, D-69120 Heidelberg, Germany. clive.bell@urz.uni-heidelberg.de
Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the Delhi School of Economics, the Institute of Eco-
nomic Growth, the Indian Statistical Institute (Delhi), the Planning Commission, the World Bank
(Delhi Resident Mission) and the Christian Michelsen Institute, Bergen. I am much indebted to the
participants for valuable comments, and to Simon Ellis, Ashok Kumar, Abhiroop Mukhopadhyay,
Indira Rajaraman and Roberto Zagha for extensive and insightful discussions during the course of the
work, while absolving them all of any responsibility for any errors that remain. The previous version
of the paper formed part of the documentation for a World Bank loan proposal. The views expressed
herein are not, however, necessarily those of the World Bank or its Board.
1
1 Introduction
In the year 2000, the Government of India embarked on the ambitious program Prad-
han Mantri Gram Sadak Yojana (hereinafter PMGSY), whose ultimate aim is to draw
India’s villages into the mainstream, especially in three domains. First, with improved,
all-weather connections to markets, villagers should face more favorable prices for in-
puts and outputs, which will raise their incomes and sharpen their incentives to cul-
tivate more intensively, pursue new activities and invest in new methods. Second,
by reducing the time spent traveling to and from school (and in the rainy season, by
making the trip actually possible), an all-weather road should improve the attendance,
not only of pupils, but also of their teachers, thus promoting the formation of human
capital and the growth of productivity over the long run. Third, by likewise improving
the villagers’ access to timely treatment, especially in the event of accidents and bouts
of acute sickness, the connection should lower mortality and morbidity. Improvements
in these domains will, if realized, reduce poverty and increase productivity in both the
short and the long run.
By any measure, PMGSY is a very large undertaking. As originally planned, all
habitations with populations exceeding 500 persons (250 in hilly and desert areas) were
to be connected by 2015. At that time, about 170,000 habitations were eligible; at this
time of writing, over 40 percent have their road. By the end of 2010, accumulated
expenditures had amounted to about US $14.6 billion, and it is now estimated that a
further US $40 billion will be required to complete the program by 2020 (World Bank,
2010). It was supposed to be wholly financed by a special cess on high-speed diesel,
but as the proceeds proved to be quite inadequate, there has been extensive resort to
other sources, including loans from the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank.
The latest installment from the World Bank involves a credit in the amount of US $1.7
billion, which was approved by the Bank’s Board in December 2010.
Three big questions arise. First, in view of the fact that what has already been
spent represents sunk costs, how are the resulting benefits best sustained and even
enhanced? Second, is a continuation of PMGSY according to past practice socially
profitable? Third, if a stop is out of the question, how can one improve on past
practice? This paper is primarily concerned with the second and third questions, but
there will be some closing remarks on the first.
The salient elements of an economic evaluation of this program are as follows.
1. The feeder roads must be constructed, and thereafter maintained, to some de-
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sired engineering standard. This public investment activity also involves making
choices among alternative techniques of construction (machines vs. labor), se-
quences of connections, tendering processes and financing.
2. Upon completion, a feeder road will reduce transportation costs and otherwise
enlarge villagers’ economic opportunities. Farmers may respond by changing their
cropping patterns and techniques, as well as what and how much they market.
These decisions depend on the village wage rate, which is itself endogenous. Local
laborers can commute more easily to work in other connected villages and towns –
and outside laborers can also compete more easily for local jobs. All villagers will
also enjoy better access to various services provided elsewhere, often in towns.
Of central importance here are schools and health facilities.
3. All these changes need to be valued. If the villagers’ preferences are known,
one can, in principle at least, compute the equivalent variation (EV), which is
the lump-sum payment such that they would be indifferent between having the
more favorable environment produced by the feeder road and going without it
but receiving the payment instead. In an economy distorted by taxes, subsidies
and market imperfections, however, this is not the end of the story. For shadow
prices will then diverge from market prices, and it is at the former that the road’s
social profitability must be calculated.
4. Each feeder road forms part of a network, which is potentially subject to so-called
‘technological’ externalities. Connecting one village to the nearest secondary or
main road will typically lower the costs of connecting other nearby villages to the
same, depending on the sequence chosen. Yet extending the network in this way is
virtually certain to increase the volume of traffic on the main roads, and hence to
increase not only wear and tear, but also the number of accidents thereon. Since
much of the additional traffic will have a town as its destination, congestion and
pollution will increase, too. It follows that the effects of the whole program are
not simply additive in those of its individual (project) components, and in the
absence of corrective taxation, some of the potential benefits may be dissipated.
5. There remain the so-called ‘pecuniary’ externalities. Connecting one or two vil-
lages to the main road is unlikely to have a measurable effect on the prices of
goods ruling in the nearest towns; but connecting many may have significant
repercussions. The prices farmers receive may actually rise if larger marketed
volumes promote market efficiency. It is also possible that some technologies for
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producing other urban goods exhibit decreasing unit costs and that these po-
tential increasing returns cannot be exploited by a resort to international trade,
so that aggregate domestic demand comes into play as a factor in determining
the profitability of these technologies. PMGSY is so large that these pecuniary
effects cannot be ignored a priori.
Any attempt at a full-blown analysis of such an investment program would be a
formidable undertaking, demanding resources and time on a scale wholly incompati-
ble with the process of preparing a loan proposal. Some fairly drastic simplifications
are, therefore, unavoidable. The approach adopted here is to begin by treating each
PMGSY road as an isolated element in a wider system, so that, at the first stage, the
loan program involves just a bundle of such unrelated elements, each with its own par-
ticular characteristics and catchment villages. At the second stage, the effects of the
bundle on the wider system are taken up, albeit largely qualitatively. It will be argued
that these external and spillover effects probably yield some net additional benefits,
but of very uncertain magnitude.
Taking each road by itself, the central problem is to estimate the benefits it generates
for the villagers in its catchment area. The classical, direct approach is to establish (or
forecast) the levels of traffic with and without the road, together with the associated
reductions in trip-costs. There are two drawbacks to this approach when applied to
poor, backward areas. First, village resources may not be fully employed and the
changes in the prices of goods bought and sold may be large, so that the road induces
a reallocation so great as to cast doubt on estimates derived in this way. Second, the
lion’s share of the benefits arising in the domains of education and health is likely to
be missed, so that arriving at an estimate of these benefits by other means is essential.
To deal with the first, I shall adopt an alternative approach, in which the change in
real village income serves as the measure of the benefits generated in the ‘commercial’
domain of village life. This, too, has its weaknesses, which will be discussed. To
deal with the second, I shall employ methods that attempt to capture the benefits in
education and health more fully by explicitly incorporating the formation of human
capital. There is also the so-called ‘capitalization’ approach, in which changes in land
values are deemed to reflect the willingness to pay for the resulting improvements in
profitability and access to amenities. This certainly has its proponents; it is discussed
in Section 7, but with reservations. Whatever be the choice of approach, however, there
remains the practical difficulty that the actual roads that will make up the package to
be financed will serve villages for which relevant data are not available, so that some
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resort to (statistical) inference based on previous experience is unavoidable.
It must be remarked that India’s system of public finances has a potentially decisive
influence on the program’s social profitability. First, PMGSY contains no provisions
for road maintenance beyond the first 5 years following initial construction. Thereafter,
maintenance becomes the responsibility of the state in question. Since the states’ fiscal
condition is a parlous one, there could be a dramatic fall in the quality of these roads,
and hence in the benefits they generate, if no system of secure, long-term financing is
put into place. Second, since PMGSY roads are part of a wider network, their social
profitability depends on the condition of that network. The district roads and state
highways are often in an unsatisfactory, and sometimes deplorable, state; so that the
larger fiscal question arises here, too. Much of past investment in PMGSY will be
wasted, and further investments will be markedly less profitable, if the wider policy
framework is deficient.
Given PMGSY’s sheer scale, it is natural to ask whether there are extant evaluations
of its social profitability. Neither a search of the literature nor presentations at some
of India’s leading research institutions uncovered any. There are certainly general
investigations into the effects of investments in rural roads on villagers’ well-being,
broadly interpreted. Two well-known studies of the sub-continent are Binswanger et
al. (1993), which is largely concerned with output and investment in rural India, and
Fan et al. (2000), which addresses welfare more directly, in that it also investigates
the effects of government spending on rural poverty. More directly connected to the
central question posed in this paper is Khandker et al. (2009), which analyzes two
panels of data in connection with Bangladesh’s Rural Roads and Market Improvement
and Maintenance Projects, which were undertaken in the late 1990s. Transport costs
were much reduced, output and net prices were boosted, as were agricultural wages
and per capita household consumption. Boys’ and girls’ schooling rose, too. Where
consumption is concerned, the distributional pattern turned out to be favorable, or at
least broadly neutral, so that there was a substantial associated reduction in poverty.
There is evidence that providing all-weather roads also reduces poverty in south-east
Asia. Between 1997-98 and 2002-03, the headcount ratio in rural Laos fell by 9.5
percentage points: Warr (2010) estimates that 13 percent of this decline is attributable
to the conversion of dry- into all-weather roads. Geographically farther afield, Escobal
and Ponce (2002, pp. 37-8) estimate that the rehabilitation of motorized rural roads
in Peru’s rugged terrain yielded the beneficiaries $120 each annually, or 35 percent of
the average per capita household income in the control group.
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The findings of these serious studies are all well and good, and they suggest that
further investments in PMGSY may well be socially profitable, but they do not estab-
lish as much. For what must be demonstrated is that spending yet more billions on
PMGSY will yield a greater improvement in welfare than like spending on the next
best alternative.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 deals with three key shadow prices
(SPs), namely, the social discount rate, the premium on public income and the conver-
sion factor for road-building. Section 3 describes the planned extension of the network
and estimates the cost, at SPs, of a representative feeder road over an assumed 30-year
lifecycle. Estimating the benefits is altogether much harder. In keeping with the three
broad domains of commerce, education and health, Section 4 is split into three corre-
sponding subsections. Various methods and sources are used, notably a survey of 30
villages in Orissa’s poor uplands (hereinafter, the Orissa Survey). Those forms of ben-
efits that have defied my attempts to measure them are indicated and briefly discussed.
The costs and measured benefits are compared in Section 5. If the former exceed the
latter, the difference is the smallest contribution required of all non-measured benefits
such that the project be socially profitable. In other words, the difference then mea-
sures the leap of faith involved in asserting such profitability. Section 6 takes up the
program’s external effects on the wider economy, and I argue that, on balance, these
will be beneficial. Alternative approaches to the measurement of benefits are briefly
discussed in Section 7. The main conclusions concerning social profitability and the
complementary policies needed to ensure it are drawn together in Section 8.
2 Shadow Prices
Market prices depart from shadow prices for various reasons: market failure, externali-
ties and, especially important in the present setting, the presence of distortionary taxes
and subsidies as well as a social desire for greater equity than that yielded by market
forces. There is no certainty whatever that replacing market prices with shadow prices
will make a project socially profitable; but given the considerations involved, doing the
accounting at SPs is strongly desirable. The practical difficulty is that estimating a
complete set of SPs is very demanding of time and resources, and no such set is avail-
able off the shelf. Some short-cuts are, therefore, unavoidable. Three central ‘prices’
demand attention, namely, the social discount rate, the premium on public income
relative to private income, and the cost at shadow prices of building and maintaining
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a representative rural feeder road.
The discount rate usually plays a decisive role in determining the profitability of
long-lived projects. In order to estimate the social discount rate, ρ, I appeal to the
(approximate) rule that, in a state of steady growth, ρ = |η| · gc + δ, where 1/η is
the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution in consumption (in other contexts, η is the
elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption), gc is the rate of growth of per capita
consumption and δ is the rate of pure impatience. It is common to assume logarithmic
inter-temporal utility, which implies η = −1. As for gc, India’s GDP per head has been
growing rapidly for more than two decades, with the initial acceleration occurring in
the early 1980s. Private per capita consumption has grown almost as fast, and the
gap in their future rates is likely to be small. The current pace of about 4.5 percent
annually will probably continue for at least another three decades. On ethical grounds,
δ should be no more than 1 percent p.a. These assumptions yield a social discount rate
of 5.5 percent. It might be argued that, especially in poor economies, consumption
in one period is a poorer substitute for consumption in another than η = −1 implies.
Consider, therefore, the rather extreme value η = −2, which implies ρ = 10 percent. It
is rather hard to justify a test discount rate any higher than this.1 The real market rate
in India, r, is much lower, and this will matter, even though the gestation period of
feeder-road projects is unlikely to exceed one year. Indeed, the government always has
the option of investing in high-quality bonds in international capital markets, wherein
real rates are likely to remain at historically low levels for some time to come. The
proposed rule ρ = |η| · gc + δ is, therefore, a conservative choice.
Valuing the benefits, which will accrue overwhelmingly to households, requires much
more than simple tinkering with shadow prices. It is not enough to value the underlying
inputs and outputs at shadow prices; one must also value the (money-metric) benefits
accruing to households relative to public income, which is the source of finance for the
road and on which there should be a premium – unless the beneficiaries are sufficiently
poor. The calculations are long and involved, quite apart from the necessity of estimat-
ing the SPs themselves. For present purposes, what matters most is the premium on
public income. This is arguably close to zero where poor communities are concerned,
for the government should then be indifferent between making a transfer to them and
keeping the money for other purposes. In the participating states, the great majority
of the communities that are scheduled to get a road surely fall into this category, so
that the monetary value of the benefits their members receive will be accorded the
1An independent study by Murty and Goldar (2007) also yields this upper estimate.
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same social value. The only obvious exception is Punjab, whose general population
enjoys comparative affluence and wherein the project will involve much upgrading of
existing roads rather than the construction of new ones. In Punjab, it is arguable that
private benefits should be discounted somewhat (see below). The same applies to some
communities in Himachal Pradesh.
Constructing and maintaining roads in India is a pretty labor-intensive business,
so there are good grounds for adjusting the corresponding costs at market prices.
Theory and empirical estimates in various developing countries suggest that the so-
called conversion factor for such construction work is typically 0.8 to 0.85, with a
corresponding reduction in the present value of lifetime costs at any given discount
rate, so there will be some help from this quarter where social profitability is concerned.
3 The Cost of Construction and Maintenance
Let the construction of a single feeder road take one year (in t = 0) and costK at market
prices. Routine maintenance thereafter costs m percent of K annually; the black-top
must be renewed every ten years, at a cost of m+m′ percent of K. Thirty years after
completion of the initial construction, let wholesale reconstruction be necessary, albeit
with a salvage value that is κ percent of the initial outlay, which represents the right-
of-way and any useful residual structures, including the road-bed. We can then confine
the calculations to the first 30-year cycle. The present value of the entire stream of
expenditures at SPs is
PV ∗(I; ρ) = πKK
[
1 +
m
ρ
(1− (1 + ρ)−29) + m
′
(1 + ρ)11
+
m′
(1 + ρ)21
− κ
(1 + ρ)30
]
(1)
where πK denotes the conversion factor for such construction.
We turn to the actual numbers, at least as forecast. The SWAp loan budgets a total
expenditure of $3.014 billion to construct 48,736 km. of roads in the participating
states of Jharkhand, Himachal Pradesh, Rajasthan, Meghalaya, Uttarakhand, Uttar
Pradesh and Punjab (World Bank, PAD, 2010, Tables 2.2 and 3.3), which implies an
average cost of $61,820 per km. This addition to the network will connect 14,274
habitations. Taking the habitation as the unit of analysis, we have K = $211, 000 for
a link-length of 3.41 km. Associated estimates are m = 0.01, m′ = 0.35 and κ = 0.25.
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Setting πK = 0.825, (1) then yields
PV ∗(I; ρ = 0.055) = 0.825× 211, 000× 1.398 = $243, 400, and
PV ∗(I; ρ = 0.10) = 0.825× 211, 000× 1.248 = $217, 200.
Although there is some uncertainty about costs at market prices, these estimates of
the average social cost of connecting a habitation are surely not too far off the mark.
As a preliminary to Section 4, observe that to any estimate of PV ∗(I; ρ) there cor-
responds a flow of annual benefits, growing at the constant rate gb over the lifetime of
the project following completion, such that the project just breaks even at the chosen
discount rate. Denoting the said flow by B+t = (1+gb)
tB+1 , where B
+
1 denotes the level
of the flow in year 1, we require
B+1 (ρ, gb) =
ρ− gb
1− [(1 + gb)/(1 + ρ)]29
PV ∗(I; ρ). (2)
For the limiting case in which the flow fails to grow, we have B+1 (ρ = 0.055, 0) =
$17, 000 and B+1 (ρ = 0.10, 0) = $23, 180. Since such roads are effectively pure public
goods when viewed as isolated elements, their social profitability depends heavily on
the number of beneficiaries. Denoting byH the number of households in the habitation,
the ‘representative’ household must enjoy a benefit of at least B+1 /H a year for the
project to pass muster at the chosen social discount rate. With the hurdle’s height
thus established, we now investigate whether the project will clear it.
4 Estimating the Benefits
The participating states under the SWAp loan vary greatly in their levels of economic
and social development. Jharkhand is poor and backward, most of its villages are but
little commercialized, and traffic volumes are low. Punjab has the highest state domes-
tic product per head in the whole Union, its agriculture is highly commercialized, rural
traffic is heavy, and its social indicators are now well above average. A new all-weather
road in Jharkhand is therefore unlikely to generate the sort of commercial benefits
flowing from one in Punjab; but such roads may also be valued quite differently by
their respective beneficiaries. These forms of heterogeneity demand careful treatment.
Viewed in isolation from the rest of the network, each road affects only those who live
within its catchment area. The villagers enjoy benefits in three broad spheres, namely,
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‘commercial’, education and health, which are taken up seriatim. The first lends itself
much more readily to estimation than the other two; but even in the commercial sphere,
there are considerable uncertainties. Indeed, the empirical basis for estimating the main
effects leaves much to be desired. The only available primary sources that provide
reasonably reliable evidence are field-notes on a tour of Assam, Himachal Pradesh and
Orissa (Bell, 2009a), a special re-survey of 240 households drawn from 30 villages in
Orissa’s uplands (Bell and van Dillen, 2012), and materials on agricultural marketing
provided by Grahame Dixie.2 A useful secondary source is Khandker et al. (2009),
which yields estimates of certain effects of rural roads in Bangladesh. The secondary
literature is otherwise disappointingly thin for present purposes. In keeping with the
aim of developing a robust estimate of the Project’s social profitability, we adopt some
extreme alternatives, as near polar as possible.
4.1 Commercial
The household is endowed with labor, land and other resources. As a consuming
unit, it has preferences over goods and leisure. Faced with the prices p ruling in the
marketplaces in which it trades, it draws up a production plan y and a consumption
plan x. The difference y − x is the vector of its net exports, and its total outlay on
transportation is c · |y − x|, where the vector of associated unit costs of transporting
goods to and fro is c. If there is complete market integration, the farmgate price of
a good that is exported (imported) will be qi ≡ pi − ci (qi ≡ pi + ci). An all-weather
feeder road is now built, which reduces the vector of unit transport costs from c1 to c2,
where the superscripts 1 and 2 denote the village environment without and with the
road, respectively.3 Leaving aside transactions in the spheres of education and health,
what value does the household place on this change in its environment?
At one extreme, let the household’s resources be fully employed, the opportunity
cost of leisure being the going wage rate w. If the household sticks with its original
plan (y1,x1), which remains feasible after the road has been provided, and there is
full market integration, its (full) income will increase by the amount of the savings in
transportation costs. If, however, the new prices and opportunities induce it to make
any adjustment to that plan, then it must do strictly better, though the resulting whole
gain in (full) income cannot exceed the total savings at the net export vector with the
2Private communication.
3The provision of an all-weather road may sharpen competition among traders who buy at the
farmgate, and so improve the farmer’s net price independently of any reductions in c. It is also
possible that increasing the number of all-weather roads will affect p. See Section 6.
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road. Hence, denoting by M c the monetary value the household places on having the
road’s services,
Δc · |y1 − x1| ≡ (c1 − c2) · |y1 − x1| ≤ M c ≤ Δc · |y2 − x2|, (3)
where M c is just the corresponding equivalent variation. A full analysis of the house-
hold’s decision problem is to be found in Bell (2009b), in which it is argued that if the
reductions in unit transport costs are sufficiently small relative to the ruling prices p,
then the interval defined by these upper and lower bounds will also be small. Illus-
trative calculations with commonly employed functional forms and a range of broadly
plausible parameter values indicate that, when unit transport costs are halved, the
lower bound is about 3 – 3.5 percent lower than the EV and the upper bound is about
6.5 – 7 percent higher, which point to the relevant compensated demand and supply
schedules being convex. At all events, this finding suggests that a very simple formula
using suitable, one-shot survey data covering villages with and without all-weather
roads will yield a defensible and rather precise estimate of the benefit accruing to a
sampled household as a result of reductions in the costs of transporting the goods
making up (y,x).
An alternative is to make no particular assumptions about how land and other non-
labor resources are supplied, nor about the extent of market integration, but to leave
open the possibility that labor is under-employed. With the usual convention that
the elements of y that are inputs take a negative sign, the household’s income from
production is qkyk, k = 1, 2. To any improvement therein must be added the benefit
arising from changes in the prices of the goods consumed, viz. those in x, which is
analogous to that appearing in (3). We have
M c ∈ [(q2y2 − q1y1)− (q2 − q1)x1, (q2y2 − q1y1)− (q2 − q1)x2], (4)
where the fact that households are intensive consumers of farm outputs, whose farmgate
prices are higher with the road, leaves open whether (q2 − q1)x1 exceeds (q2 − q1)x2,
or conversely. In this alternative, the upper and lower bounds on the total benefit
incorporate any changes in the production plan induced by the road.
One can be more precise by imposing some restrictions on households’ preferences.
Let the indirect utility function be written v(q,M), where M denotes the level of
lump-sum income. Then, by definition, M c is such that v(q2,M) = v(q1,M +M c). If
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preferences are quasi-homothetic, the indirect utility function can be written
v(q,M) =
q · y +M − q · γ
φ(q)
,
where γ denotes the ‘subsistence’ bundle and φ(·) is an exact (Ko¨nus) cost-of-living
index, which includes the opportunity cost of leisure, even if this does not vary. Hence,
M c =
q2y2 +M
φ(q2)
− q
1y1 +M
φ(q1)
−
(
q2 · γ
φ(q2)
− q
1 · γ
φ(q1)
)
. (5)
Aggregating over all households in the village yields the total ‘commercial’ benefit
Bc = M cH . It is seen that transactions between villagers, whether in the form of
tenancy, or labor services, draught animals, animal feed, or whatever, simply net out; so
that the resulting sum is just the village’s domestic product plus any net factor income
from its dealings with the rest of the economy, that is to say, gross village income
(analogously to gross national income). Any changes in the aggregate production plan
involve mainly changes in the purchases of inputs that the village cannot supply itself,
such as artificial fertilizers, pesticides, motor fuel, certified seeds and the like, with
an allowance for the costs of additional credit when needed. There is, however, a
snag in employing (5) in practice. Whereas an exact cost-of-living index will duly
incorporate the value of leisure, the standard indices do not; nor, moreover, is leisure
measured in the surveys available for present purposes. Changes in the real cost of the
subsistence bundle are also ignored. Hence, estimates of Bc derived from (5) using,
say, the consumer price index for agricultural laborers (CPIAL) and data on household
incomes, as the surveys define income, will involve errors; but if the changes in leisure
are small, these are unlikely to be serious.
Each of these alternatives is now illustrated with actual examples, drawing on Bell
(2009a). The community in Himachal Pradesh enjoys a good standard of living and
is heavily commercialized, the principal crop being apples. A stretch of some 12 km.
of all-weather road was completed under PMGSY in the middle of 2009, at a cost
of about Rs 30 million. It serves five villages, whose combined population is about
2000 persons, living in some 350 or more households. Ten percent have no orchard;
the rest own, on average, about 400 trees, which yield about 500 boxes at 25 kg. to
the box in a normal year. Before the road was constructed, there was just a kutcha
track, which truckers were rarely prepared to enter, and portage (usually by Nepalis)
over footpaths was arduous, often exceeding 1.5 km. In 2008, the average cost was Rs
20 a box; in the 2009 season, thanks to the road, it fell to Rs 7 a box, the average
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distance to the pick-up point now averaging 250 meters. Richer horticulturists have
their own pick-ups or even trucks. Those with smaller orchards usually band together
in groups to make up a truckload for long-haul trips. In an interesting development,
the villagers have started to diversify into pears, kiwis and cherries, all more delicate
fruits requiring good packing and fair roads if spoilage is to be kept low. The road has
given this development a strong impulse, and without the need to grub up apple trees
to make way for the new stands, some spare land being available.
Applying (1) with the maintenance costs m = 0.0095, m′ = 0.345 and salvage param-
eter κ = 0.25, we obtain PV ∗(I; ρ = 0.055) = Rs 34.32 million and PV ∗(I; ρ = 0.10) =
Rs 30.71 million. Turning to the benefits so generated, an average household saves
about Rs 6500 (= 500 × (20 − 7)) a year in transport costs for the marketing of its
main crop. Summing over the 315 households who own orchards yields an aggregate of
Rs 2.05 million a year, whose present value (allowing for the period of construction) at
ρ = 0.055 is Rs 29.38 million. This is certainly smaller than the lower bound on M c,
first, because other goods besides apples are traded and, second, because diversification
into other crops is occurring. Hence, even if one restricts the benefits to those in the
commercial domain, the road is almost surely socially profitable at the discount rate
of 5.5 percent.
This finding prompts the question, how big must the benefits not included in the
above calculation be if (bare) profitability is to be maintained at the stiffer test rate
of 10 per cent? Since B+1 (ρ = 0.10, 0) = 0.10 (1− 1.10−29)−1 · 30.71 = 3.28 million, the
answer is, at least Rs 1.23 (= 3.28 − 2.05) million annually, or just over one half of
the savings in transporting the current main crop. This sum is not beyond the realms
of the possible; but in the light of the modest volume of trade in other commodities
and the fact that the villagers already enjoyed good access to education and health
facilities before the road was constructed, it seems rather doubtful that help from this
quarter would ensure profitability at the test rate of 10 percent. No allowance is made,
however, for the possibility that the value of the total benefits will grow over the life
of the road, a possibility taken up in Section 5.
To illustrate the results for the alternative, in which changes in leisure and the
opportunity cost of labor are ignored, I draw once more on Bell (2009a), this time
in connection with Orissa’s impoverished uplands. The following calculations are a
little rough, but arguably convey a fair idea of what more refined methods and data
might well yield. This field-trip covered six PMGSY roads, all recently constructed and
typically costing Rs 20 - 30 million. The populations so served – some directly, others
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indirectly – varied somewhat in size, from about 5,500 to 9,000 according to the 2001
Census. Assuming an average household size of 5.5, and allowing for population growth
in the interim, the typical catchment area contains about 1,400 households. Deflate
this to 1,200 to allow for the fact that as many as one half enjoy only an indirect
connection. To arrive at an estimate of the benefit per household, I employ a related
estimate from Khandker et al.’s (2009) study of rural roads in Bangladesh, namely,
that the ‘commercial’ benefit is 11 percent of per capita household consumption. In
2001, the average household income in the 30-village sample referred to above was Rs
16,600 (van Dillen, 2008). Since average savings rates in these communities are surely
low, set average household consumption at Rs 15,000, thereby yielding a corresponding
commercial benefit of Rs 1,650 a year, or about Rs 2,250 in 2008 prices. Scaling up by
the effective number of households in the catchment, we obtain an aggregate annual
benefit in the commercial sphere alone of Rs 2.70 million. At ρ = 5.5 percent, the
present value thereof is Rs 38.70 million, which handsomely exceeds the present value
of the investment costs in the range of Rs 22.9 – 34.4 million. At ρ = 0.10 percent, the
present value of the ‘commercial’ benefits is Rs 25.30 million, which lies in the middle
of the range of PV ∗(I; ρ = 0.10), namely, Rs 20.5 – 30.7 million. With the benefits
in the spheres of education and health still to come into the reckoning, there is every
prospect that all these roads will indeed pass at the test rate of 10 percent, even if the
flow of benefits does not grow.
By way of comparison with the first alternative, Bell and van Dillen (2012) estimate
that the unit transport costs for goods are reduced by about 5 percent of the net price
received for commodities marketed. Khandker et al. (2009) obtain a similar estimate
for rural roads in Bangladesh, once an allowance is made for greater volumes marketed.
The latter also estimate that the farm-gate price of fertilizers declined by 5 percent.
This similarity supports the ‘importation’ of the estimated (proportional) effect on
family consumption in Bangladesh to arrive at the same in Orissa.
4.2 Education
The provision of an all-weather road can affect the formation of human capital through
formal education in a variety of ways. If there is no school in the village itself, the
savings in the time children spend traveling to and fro can be devoted to other pursuits,
not least homework, and attendance may be better in adverse weather. The same holds
for their teachers wherever the school be located, unless the teachers live very close by.
Such a road may also reduce morbidity among children by improving access to health
14
care, and so improve school attendance. To express all this formally, let τ denote the
fraction of each day spent going to and fro, d1 the fraction of each school year (of,
say, 180 days) lost to illness, and ξ that lost to other involuntary absences, whether of
pupils or their teachers. Taking a whole cohort of children, the fraction of the years
of school-age that can be devoted to actual schooling, allowing for eating, bathing and
suchlike in the waking hours, is then e¯ ≡ (1 − d1)(1 − ξ)/(1 + τ). Improvements in
the accessibility of facilities may, by increasing e¯, produce permanent growth effects
(Bell, 2011); they may also lead to lower drop-out rates in the short run. Lastly,
there is a potentially powerful indirect effect: by raising incomes, the road will increase
households’ capacity and willingness to invest in education, and so ultimately attain e¯.
As before, we must try to estimate the value that households place on this enlargement
of their opportunities.
Starting as in Section 4.1 with the full-employment, neo-classical alternative, the
value of a small reduction in travel-time for children attending school is proportional
to the opportunity cost of their time, as assessed by the household – provided parents
choose e < e¯. If their choice is actually limited by e¯, an additional term arises in
connection with the associated Lagrange multiplier. An analogous expression holds
for a small reduction in morbidity. The exact expressions in a three-generation OLG-
setting are derived in Bell (2011), whereby both fully reflect the indirect effect of the
road on income. Since the current cohort averages six years of completed schooling,
the children are effectively of secondary school age; so that the said opportunity cost
is arguably the going wage for juvenile workers, pro-rated up to 365 days a year.
Involuntary absences from school due to bad weather, which the road surely reduces,
might seem to involve smaller losses. For if parents choose e < e¯, sufficiently small
departures of the decision variables from their optimal values will have only second-
order effects on the value of the objective function; so that one could argue that the
costs of such involuntary absences are also small: when not at school, the children will
have other things to do. The accumulation of ‘small’ absences over a run of years can,
however, result in the need to repeat a class, or to dropping out, neither of which is a
small event. Taking a cohort as a whole, it seems defensible to do a calculation along
the lines of that for savings in travel-time and then to take some fraction of the number
that emerges: to be cautious, one-half would be the upper limit. If, however, parents
choose e¯, every involuntary absence can be very costly.
Bell and van Dillen’s (2012) estimates of (d1, ξ, τ) with and without an all-weather
road for a poor, upland region of Orissa are employed here. They are, respectively,
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(0.020, 0.011, 0.040) and (0.020, 0.050, 0.080), where it should be noted that the failure
of morbidity to improve is almost surely attributable to the fact that the roads in
question were very new. The corresponding values of e¯ are 0.902 and 0.862, respectively,
a difference that implies a substantial growth effect. Estimating the benefits generated
by these changes will involve estimating those stemming from reductions in mortality.
A combined estimate is provided in Section 4.3.
4.3 Health
The role played by the all-weather road in this sphere is like that in the sphere of
education. If there is no doctor or clinic in the village, the sick and injured can be
brought to one without excessive delay, or the doctor himself may come in good time,
whereby the ubiquitous cell telephone now places taxis and ambulances alike on call. In
a grave emergency, timely treatment and a fairly smooth ride on the way can make the
difference between life and death; and in less acute cases, such treatment can restore
the patient more swiftly to full health. With a shorter and less tiresome journey, the
chronically sick may present themselves more frequently, as may the healthy for routine
check-ups and immunisations. The distinction between morbidity and mortality is not
only important analytically, but putting a value on the former turns out to be easier
than doing so on the latter.
Beginning, therefore, with morbidity, it should be remarked that it is improbable that
the provision of the road in itself will alter the villagers’ disease environment, unless,
for example, the excavation work leaves behind fine breeding grounds for mosquitoes,
or the easier access to towns and markets increases their exposure to communicable
diseases. Taking the disease environment as given, the change in the accessibility of
treatment will normally lead people to make more use of it. Treated patients should be
back on their feet and able to work or go to school that much sooner, as well as spared
some pain and suffering. Where sheer capacity is concerned, the savings in time so
lost can be valued at the sick person’s opportunity cost thereof, analogously to Section
4.2; but valuing less pain and suffering admits of no such short-cut. However they be
valued, both of these benefits are ‘produced’ by paying for the treatment. Road or no,
therefore, the damage caused by a bout of illness or an injury is the sum of the value
placed on time lost, pain and suffering and the costs of treatment.4 Here, it should
be noted that without the all-weather road, it may be simply impossible to get any
treatment at all, at least in a timely way, so that the household is then effectively
4Excluding pain and suffering, this is the so-called cost-of-illness in the health economics literature.
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rationed. Yet as long as the damage done by a bout of illness is sufficiently small
in relation to full income, the value placed on having the road’s services will be the
resulting reduction in that damage. Given the difficulty of estimating it, let the cost of
pain and suffering be excluded, which will leave us with quantities we can measure to
yield a correspondingly conservative estimate of the (money-metric) benefits generated.
Turning to the very real possibility that the road will make all the difference in
a life-and-death emergency, there is no such ready simplification where mortality is
concerned. For the household’s preferences and the formation of expectations about
future levels of mortality now appear explicitly when the Envelope Theorem is applied
to the corresponding Lagrangian (Bell, 2011). It follows that there is no avoiding the
need to explore some numerical examples in order to obtain some feel for the size of
the value placed on reduced mortality relative to that of other benefits, even if one
were to treat the savings in time in the classical way.
As in Section 4.2, Bell and van Dillen’s (2012) empirical estimates are employed.
They find no evidence that the disease environment differed between villages with and
without an all-weather road, nor that there were any differences in morbidity – as
noted above, with the caveat that the roads were very new. The estimated morbidity
rates for the three, 20-year age groups are (0.02, 0.04, 0.08). The evidence concerning
reductions in mortality is mixed: the individual life histories suggest there were none,
but the respondents in each village were adamant that two or three lives had been
saved annually. The latter claim implies a reduction in premature adult mortality
of 20-25 percent. In the base case reported below, the rather conservative reduction
of 10 percent (not 10 percentage points) is employed. Together with the estimated
improvements in the prices for goods set out in Section 4.1 and those in the sphere
of education in Section 4.2, this reduction in mortality completes the description of
the improvement in the village environment brought about by the provision of an
all-weather road.
The next task is to value all these various components, paying particular attention
to the relative contributions of those in the commercial and non-commercial spheres,
respectively. The framework involves three overlapping generations, each spanning 20
years (Bell, 2011). The EV for young adults at the start, when the road is provided
in period 1, is obtained by finding lump-sum payments such that they would attain
the same level of expected utility were they confronted instead with the less favourable
environment ruling without a road. Since most will survive into old age and, in this
model, there are no financial instruments beyond pooling in the form of the extended
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family, it is desirable to smooth the payments. For simplicity, let there be one payment
in period 1, T 21 , which each young adult will enjoy for sure, and another of equal size
in period 2, conditional on the individual surviving into old age.
The model yields the following estimate of the magnitude of the combined benefits
in the spheres of education and health relative to those in the ‘commercial’ sphere,
with the caveat that its calibration involves much that is somewhat tentative and
speculative. Given that the road reduces the prevailing mortality rate among prime-
age adults by 10 percent, the ratio of commercial to non-commercial benefits in the first
period of 20 years is about two to one, falling to four to five in the next such period. If
the reduction in the said mortality rate were, instead, 15 percent, the ratios would be
about three to two and two to three, respectively. Since estimating the willingness to
pay in the commercial sphere is practicable, as laid out and actually implemented in
Section 4.1, applying these ratios yields an estimate of the total money-metric benefit
generated by an all-weather road that has a clear empirical anchoring. Thus armed,
we proceed to do the accounting for individual roads.
5 Summing Up
Continuing to treat the village as an isolated element in a wider system, recall from (2)
that the total benefits received by its inhabitants annually must be at least as large as
B+1 if the provision of its all-weather feeder road is to be socially profitable. Measuring
some forms of benefits is evidently far easier than others, or least involves much less
speculation. We begin, therefore, where the going is easier, in the hope that B+1 will
be reached before strong appeals to more debatable contributions become necessary.
Recalling (2), the growth of benefits over the lifetime of the road must now be
brought into the reckoning. There is a potential pitfall here. For if the social discount
rate is derived on the premise that a mere increase in population contributes nothing
to social welfare, as is implicitly assumed in Section 3, then only benefits per capita
(or household) are to be counted, scaled up by the original size of the population to
yield the aggregate in any period. The polar alternative is to let numbers count in
full, so that even if per capita benefits were constant, total benefits would still grow at
the same pace as the population. Although some scholars take this radical Benthamite
position, I do not, and it will not be considered further in this paper.5
5Given this ethical view, ρ = |η| · gc + δ − n, where n is the (constant) rate of population growth.
Introducing n to obtain the total benefits in any year after the first would therefore involve double-
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There is every reason to suppose that per capita (in the present framework, per
household) benefits will grow as a result of changes in the rest of the economic environ-
ment, and good ones to suppose that an all-weather road will enable those living in its
catchment area to exploit these opportunities more fully. As agricultural productivity
increases, so will the volumes of goods traded within and across the catchment’s bound-
aries, as will the numbers of trips taken by individuals, for the purposes of business,
work, education, health and pleasure. As their incomes rise, individuals will, moreover,
place higher values on education and health. In the light of these considerations, it is
plausible that providing a village with an all-weather road has a continuing effect on
the growth rate of incomes rather than just on their levels, where the latter correspond
to B+1 (ρ, 0). How big is this growth-effect likely to be? In a careful study of a panel of
thousands of households drawn from 240 villages spread over 15 of the biggest states,
Foster and Rosenzweig (2004) found that per capita incomes rose by 70 percent over
the period 1982-1999, implying an average annual growth rate of 3.1 percent. Much
of this growth stemmed from increased earnings from non-agricultural activities, for
which transport connections are important. In the coming decades, this overall pace
is likely to accelerate somewhat, as the economy becomes better integrated. This does
not imply, of course, that the growth-effect that concerns us here is at least 3.1 percent
a year; for what we are seeking is the size of an inter-action effect between changes
in the rest of the economy and the provision of a road to the villages in a particular
catchment area. Given the prospect of faster growth in the future than during the
period 1982-1999 and the enabling effect of all-weather roads, I hazard the guess that
gb will average 2 percent a year over the next 30 years.
With this preliminary, it is instructive to return to the actual examples in Section 4.1.
The estimated value of B+1 (ρ = 0.10, 0) for the affluent village in Himachal Pradesh is
Rs 3.28 million a year. A conservative estimate of the aggregate commercial benefits
is Rs 2.05 million, leaving Rs.1.23 million to be found in other forms. As noted earlier,
the villagers had rather good access to education and health facilities even before the
road was completed, so help from those quarters may well be limited. Data of the kind
provided by the Orissa Survey are lacking, moreover, which adds to the uncertainties
in the calculations that follow. There are about 2,000 persons in some 350 households,
with a school-age population of, say, 500. In the light of the findings for Orissa,
the annual savings in travel-time and reductions in days lost due to bad weather are
unlikely to exceed 5 days each per child. Suppose the daily wage rate for juveniles in
counting. Since the discount rate also affects the present value of costs, it is essential to modify ρ;
but the per capita benefits may not be scaled up. In what follows, we do neither.
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this region is Rs 40 and that all the days lost due to bad weather are likewise valued.
Then, at this opportunity cost, the total annual savings for the whole village amount
to Rs 0.20 million, whereby the limit e¯ will not reached until 20 years will have passed.
The Orissa Survey data suggest that while, in the short-run at least, the road will
have little effect on morbidity, there is substantial willingness to pay for treatment.
Putting a value on the latter is difficult, however, so we leave it aside for the moment.
Turning to mortality, the assumption that the road will reduce the rate among prime-
age adults by 10 percent (see Section 4.3), while conservative in Orissa, may be on the
optimistic side for Himachal Pradesh. Suppose, therefore, that a reduction of only half
as much will result. Since the changes are quite small, the components making up the
EV do so approximately linearly; so that, in the first 20-year period, the two-to-one
ratio will shrink to four-to-one – in the extreme case that the estimated Rs 0.20 million
associated with school attendance is also halved. The aggregate ‘measurable’ annual
benefits at this stage are, therefore, Rs 2.69 (= 1.25 × (2.05 + 0.10)) million, leaving
us still Rs 0.59 million short.
One way of finding this missing sum is, first, to list what has not been measured and
valued: in the commercial sphere, trade in commodities other than the main crop and
substitution into more valuable crops when there is land to spare; in that of education,
the fact that producing better educated citizens arguably also yields a public good; and
in that of health, any reductions in pain and suffering or in infant and child mortality.
The second step involves an assertion of belief, namely, that the sum of these benefits
for the community in question is at least Rs 0.59 million a year. If doubts persist on
this score, then recourse must be made to the existence of net external benefits that
arise in the economic system as a whole (see Section 6 below).
The sceptical reader will stick with that which has been measured with some con-
fidence, and on that basis establish the discount rate at which the project would just
pass muster. Setting the annual stream of benefits at Rs 2.69 million, he or she will
obtain ρ = 7.0 percent, which also establishes how great the leap of faith must be when
the bar is set at 10 percent. Does gb = 0.02 supply the required boost? Eq. (2) yields
B+1 (ρ = 0.10, 0.02) = Rs 2.77 million. This is still not quite enough, but now only very
modest help from elsewhere is needed.
The poor villages in Orissa’s uplands are much less commercialized, but labor there
is also arguably under-employed. Recall from Section 4.1 that in a sample of 30 such
villages, the estimated aggregate annual commercial benefits average at about Rs 2.70
million. Proceeding as before, the Orissa Survey yields estimated savings in travel-
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time and reductions in school-days lost due to bad weather at about 6 and 10 days
per child, respectively. Suppose the daily wage rate for juveniles in this poor region
is Rs 30 and that all the days lost due to bad weather are likewise valued. Then,
at this opportunity cost, the total annual savings for the whole village amount to
Rs 0.34 million. In this less healthy environment, an all-weather road should have a
greater impact on premature adult mortality: as argued in Section 4.3, let this rate
decline by 10 percent instead of the 5 pe cent in Himachal Pradesh. The aggregate
‘measurable’ annual benefits at this stage are, using the two-to-one ratio, Rs 4.31
(= 1.5× (2.70 + 0.17)) million. The present value thereof at ρ = 0.10 over the 30-year
cycle is Rs 40.34 million, which greatly exceeds the upper end of the estimated range of
PV ∗(I; ρ = 0.10), namely, Rs 30.8 million. No help is needed from any other quarter.
One can argue, of course, that the implicit assumption of a zero opportunity cost of
labor is too strong, so that the estimated commercial benefits are too high. Suppose,
in a drastic step, we were to halve them, so that the present value of the ‘measurable’
annual benefit stream of Rs 2.28 million at ρ = 0.10 would be Rs 21.36 million, which
is somewhat above the low end of the estimated range of PV ∗(I; ρ = 0.10), namely,
Rs 20.5 million. Some help is now arguably needed from other quarters. Taking the
middle of the range for PV ∗(I; ρ = 0.10), the value of B+(ρ = 0.10) is Rs 2.71 million,
so that Rs 0.43 million must be found from elsewhere. If none can be, the project will
just pass at ρ = 7.4 percent.
In fact, the Orissa Survey provides strong support for the contention that the benefits
in the domains of education and health are even more substantial relative to the ‘com-
mercial’ ones. The respondents in those villages that had received an all-weather road
by December 2009 were asked to rank the three domains – commercial, education and
health – according to the size of the corresponding benefits they had enjoyed from the
new road thus far. The commercial and health domains were roughly equally ranked
(with 31 and 29 first, and 23 and 28 second ranks, respectively), whereas education
lagged far behind (Bell and van Dillen, 2012). It is possible that the latter reflects
the fact that 28 of the 30 villages have their own primary school, but only two have
a secondary school, whereby these poor families may place little value on secondary
education. The respondents were also asked to rank the benefits stemming from the
commercial domain against those from education and health combined: 24 ranked the
former first, 18 put them on a par, 28 ranked the latter first, and one expressed no
opinion. These rankings suggest that in the respondents’ eyes, the benefits in the do-
mains of education and health are roughly as large as those in the commercial domain,
which are much more readily measurable to outsiders. These self-reported assessments
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are also broadly consistent with the results yielded by the OLG-model, as reported in
Section 4.3. One need not shy, therefore, from following the drastic step of halving the
commercial benefits by simply doubling them once more to yield the estimated total
benefit of Rs 2.70 million, which implies that the project will just about pass at ρ =
10 percent, even without an appeal to gb = 0.02. On the basis of these rather cautious
assumptions, one can claim with some confidence that all-weather roads in Orissa’s
uplands are indeed socially profitable.
6 Externalities, Spillovers and Other System-wide
Effects
The individual feeder road is, of course, only an element in a wider network, and
viewing it in isolation, as we have done thus far, is but a first step and a provisional
simplification. In general, a new feeder will have effects that ramify through the whole
system in ways that are complicated and hard to estimate. What follows is, therefore,
sketchy and strictly qualitative.
First, since the very aim of connecting villages to the mainstream involves increasing
the movement of goods and people to centers of activity in the main network, it also
involves more wear and tear, congestion, pollution and accidents therein, all of them
adverse effects on existing users and hence additional items on the cost side of the
ledger. Second, to the extent that there are economies of agglomeration in these centers
– and there is some evidence that this is indeed a source of decreasing unit costs in
many urban activities – connecting villages to them will induce benefits external to the
local catchments served by the feeders themselves. Third, there is substantial evidence
that larger traded volumes are associated with lower marketing margins on agricultural
products, so that farmers receive higher prices, but not wholly at the expense of urban
consumers. Fourth, inasmuch as a rural road makes life in its catchment area more
attractive, it will tend to slow the pace of rural-urban migration, and so relieve the
growing pressures on urban infrastructure and amenities. Since the dense populations
of cities also promote the pools and propagation of numerous communicable diseases,
there are external benefits on this score, too. Fifth, and closely related to the fourth
category, if the villages are well-connected, non-farm work can be brought to them, as
it was in the putting-out system in Japan’s industrialization.
Listing and signing effects is one thing, weighting them to produce a net result is
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altogether something else. It seems safe to say, however, that using the findings of a
purely ‘local’ analysis of a rural feeder road is not obviously heavily biased one way or
the other where assessing its social profitability is concerned. The external costs are,
perhaps, more tangible and thoroughly researched than the corresponding benefits; but
if pressed, I think the latter will outweigh the former in the present setting.
One other form of ‘externality’ must be mentioned. There are numerous reports
that once a road has been built, politicians and bureaucrats take a sudden interest in
visiting the communities it – and they – serve. This development is to be welcomed,
though no attempt will be made here to put a (money-metric) value on it.
7 Other Approaches: Capitalization
Those who own land in a new road’s catchment area will benefit from it in various
ways, and if the markets for this land and credit function well, the willingness to pay
for such benefits will be fully reflected in the resulting changes in land prices. This so-
called ‘capitalization’ approach to estimating the benefits (net of any costs entailed by
ownership, such as land taxes) is well-established in the regional and urban economics
literature; but there are drawbacks when applying it to poor rural regions. First, credit
markets are very imperfect and the land market is usually thin. When respondents are
asked what particular plots are worth, their answers are therefore bound to be rather
speculative, especially if a road has been built only recently. Second, the new road
may affect other factor markets. The ensuing effects on landowners are fully captured
in the values of their plots, in the textbook version at least. Yet whilst households
that depend mostly on agricultural labor almost invariably own a small house-plot
and garden, any changes in their welfare stemming from changes in wage rates and
employment possibilities will not be captured by summing up the changes in the values
of individual landholdings in their communities. Third, of all the wider effects outlined
in Section 6, only the chance that new non-farm activities will arise in the catchment
area will be covered in such an accounting. Fourth, as a purely practical matter,
mapping all the land in a catchment and assigning it a rental gradient before and after
the advent of a road is likely to be a burdensome affair, more so than identifying the
communities and sampling their inhabitants. It is worth remarking, however, that one
careful study of Madagascar (Jacoby and Minten, 2009) arrives at the conclusion that
the ‘capitalization’ approach yields a much larger estimated benefit than that pursued
in Section 4, whereby the former is naturally rather sensitive to the discount rate.
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Reports that land prices begin to rise sharply as soon as there is a credible announce-
ment that construction has been sanctioned are commonplace. The subject came up
almost always in Bell’s (2009a) discussions with villagers in Assam, Himachal Pradesh
and Orissa, in which quite startling claims, often of many-fold increases, were usually
followed by remarks to the effect that there had been very few, if any, actual sales.
Quite some time must elapse after construction before settled valuations based on
transactions displace speculative guessing. One hopes that enough panel surveys will
be carried out to reveal how things actually develop over the whole course of events,
from before any announcement to full maturity many years afterwards. For such evi-
dence would provide an invaluable check on the estimates derived from the approach
pursued in this paper.
8 Conclusions
The three big questions posed in the Introduction are addressed seriatim.
Preserving and enhancing current benefits
The benefits generated by past investments will continue undiminished only if the
PMGSY roads are properly maintained. The associated outlays will be very modest
in comparison, and the consequences of neglecting to make them can be readily expe-
rienced by taking a ride at random on the district and state highways to which the
PMGSY roads are connected.
The technical capacity to keep this extension of the network up to scratch appears
to be adequate, but the outlook for actually financing the work is poor. Although the
five-year provision in the contracts is helpful, it is seen to be just a stop-gap measure
when viewed against the roads’ economic lifetime. Many engineers claimed that the
funds allocated to the maintenance of the P.W.D. network are but a fraction of the
amount needed to keep it in good order – one-third at best, often a quarter or less.
The villagers in Assam, H.P. and Orissa with whom I spoke on my field-trip had not
only a firm opinion of where the responsibility lies, but also a blithely optimistic as-
sessment of the states’ finances. In fact, each link is an almost ideal local public good,
whose beneficiaries are readily identifiable and ought to contribute to its management
and upkeep, supported by a matching grant from the state government that is suit-
ably calibrated to their community’s economic condition. All the classic problems of
provision and collective action arise: the villagers will (and did) protest their poverty,
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the burden must be distributed among them, and that hardy perennial, ‘the lack of
political will’, will smother efforts to take real action at higher levels of government.
Yet India’s constitution provides for communities to raise taxes as part of its design to
further local democracy. Since a start must be made sometime, why not now?
Enhancing the benefits generated by past investments requires exploiting certain
opportunities that arise within public infrastructure as a whole. In the wider road
network, for example, the miserable state of most district roads limits the gains from
PMGSY, since most trips involve a stretch of travel on both. Rural roads complement
certain other forms of investment, in the sense that the joint returns are larger than
the sum of those yielded by the separate components. Intuition suggests that this
is especially so for irrigation, but it is likely to hold also for electricity and drinking
water. Rural roads are, in contrast, good substitutes for local health facilities and
schools. There is no need to have a primary health centre in every cluster of villages
when a taxi or ambulance can be quickly summoned by telephone, nor a middle and
high school when adolescents can easily cycle up to 8 km in little more than half an
hour – and all of them would benefit from such daily exercise. A planned system of
hubs will produce big savings, even if the bikes are provided free from the public purse.
Is a continuation of PMGSY socially profitable?
This question must be posed, even if a stop is politically unthinkable. For there are
always alternative uses of public funds, and scrutinising any given proposal using a
common procedure imposes a measure of discipline on the thinking that leads up to
decisions, if not on the decisions themselves.
The calculations in Sections 4 - 5 indicate that providing roads to villages in the hilly
states is probably not socially profitable at the discount rate of 10 percent. Yet the net
returns in the other participating states easily make good these shortfalls, even without
an appeal to ‘growth effects’ generated by the larger economy, or to the existence of net,
positive external effects produced by rural roads on the larger economy. On balance,
Section 6 suggests that there are such effects, but the magnitude of the net benefit is
shrouded in uncertainty.
The formal estimates of the benefits generated in the spheres of education and health
are substantial in size, though the method used to arrive at them has its weaknesses.
The respondents in the Orissa survey ranked these benefits roughly on a par with the
commercial ones, as did many of the villagers with whom I spoke on my field-trip.
When a passable road may well be decisive in life-and-death emergencies, people will
indeed value it highly. At all events, it is reassuring that two such radically different
25
approaches to estimating a vital magnitude yield broadly similar results.
Improving the social profitability of future investment
All the points about preserving and enhancing the benefits generated by past invest-
ment are relevant here. Particularly important are, first, reforming the system of local
taxation so that the panchayats will begin to assume responsibility for the provision
of local public goods, and second, ensuring co-ordination among departments in ad-
vance in order to exploit complementarities and avoid overlaps when different forms of
investment are substitutes.
When designing the roads, the engineers are sometimes unduly constrained by the
central guidelines and their inability to acquire land under eminent domain. These
restrictions can affect not only the geometry of the road, but also its durability. The
present emphasis appears to be on keeping initial outlays on construction low, with the
implicit goal of maximizing the rate at which connections are made. A better decision
criterion would be to minimize a road’s capitalized lifetime cost – ideally at shadow
prices. This would encourage design with an eye on durability and the long-term traffic
load the road is likely to carry.
PMGSY is already generating more traffic in the rest of the network. At maturity,
the extra volume is likely to be large. Given the existing volume of traffic and the
numerous ‘choke points’ along any extensive stretch of national or state highway, this
extra traffic will result in even more congestion, pollution and accidents. A reform of
traffic policy, including road pricing, is in order.
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